' and symptom review.6 The authors generally advocate asking every patient specific questions related to possible disease in each system. As many as 60 questions may be asked,9 less those already asked with the presenting complaints, but with additional questions if any of the routine ones prove positive. Of the clinical methods texts reviewed, only Swash and Mason' in listing their "routine questions" suggest that only those relevant to the system suggested by the presenting complaints should be put. All eight of the 13 Perhaps the most telling indictment of the system review is that experienced clinicians do not use it. The exigencies of clinical practice alone could not permit such a time consuming process, laying aside its unproven utility and potential for interference. Depending on the complexity of the clinical problem, many of the questions will be asked anyhow, but for problem solving, not by rote. We all indulge to some extent in routine data collection by history and examination depending on the needs of our own practice and our interests. This serves as a hedge against premature restriction of working hypotheses and also as a labour saving device to reduce cognitive strain.'7 The routine measurement of blood pressure is one such observation of proven utility.
Potential value of system related symptoms in problem solving
Is the system review an unmitigated disaster? The short answer, despite what has gone before, is "no." Through the catechism of the system review the student learns to associate symptoms with systems.
This will be an aid to the critical step of hypothesis generation and testing which Elstein and colleagues" believe is the natural bent of most students anyhow. Unfortunately, the review as taught is unrefined as well as undirected and does not take advantage of the fact that symptoms have great value as, variously, pointers to anatomy, pathology, and physiology (disturbances of function). The tiro clinical student could with his or her preclinical knowledge, and with instruction in the diagnostic importance of symnptoms, start generating and testing hypotheses from the start, while embarking on the critical process of learning about diseases.
Perhaps the most telling indictment of the system review is that experienced clinicians do not use it Clinical training would be devoted to using probability and utility in hypothesis generation, to learning the techniques of physical examination to gather relevant information, and to the all important, but undertaught goal of the clinical process-namely, optimal management of the patient. Diagnosis is a means to an end, not an end in itself. The undirected collection of clinical information for "diagnosis" too often side tracks the clinician who forgets this vital fact.28
Conclusion
The art of the clinical process lies in seeking the relevant information to achieve the goal of optimal care for our patients. This means asking the right questions, not every question, be it by history, examination, use of diagnostic aids and of the very pathology reports, electrocardiograms, and x rays requested. Hampton and colleagues' much quoted study29 shows the supreme importance of the history in reaching the correct diagnosis. The The devolution of decision making to the local operational level is one of the government's main objectives for the NHS. This is expected to secure local commitment; to produce services that are more responsive to the needs of patients; and to achieve greater value for money.' Encouraging the establishment of self governing hospitals is a key component of the policy designed to meet these aims.
Self governing hospitals will operate as independent trusts within the NHS. Each trust will be run by a board of directors with the chairman appointed by the Secretary of State. The board will be responsible for determining overall policy, while day to day management will be the responsibility of the general manager. Trusts will derive their income from service contracts obtained from districthealth authorities, general practitioner budget holders, and private patients. The government views competition between trusts, other NHS hospitals, and private hospitals as a mechanism for increasing efficiency and patient choice.
Initially it is intended that trusts will be restricted to major short stay hospitals with over 250 beds, although eventually other hospitals are expected to become eligible for self governing status. * The government has a flexible definition of a self governing hospital * Self governing hospitals could offer a range of community based services as well as acute care * There could be self governing community units * Neighbouring hospitals offering complementary services could combine into a single selfgoverning unit.
Most of the advantages expected to result from self government derive from the greater autonomy that hospitals will be given to manage their own affairs. As in the case of the government's privatisation programme greater freedom from centrally imposed restrictions and bureaucratic control is expected to improve management's performance. Two main areas where this will apply are employment policy and capital spending.
Employment policy
Self governing hospitals will be given the freedom to determine their own staffing levels, rates of pay, and conditions of service. This freedom will cover all categories of staff, including doctors and nurses. The white paper argues that it is particularly important that trusts should be able directly to employ their own consultants. In determining rates of pay they may find it convenient to adopt national agreements. Alternatively, they may opt for arrangements that suit their local labour market conditions. Clearly, the government intends to remove what it sees as restrictive practices on pay and employment and to encourage a far more competitive labour market. What consequences can be expected to result from these changes?
... doctors can also expect to be affected by the emergence ofsalary differentials.
Freedom to determine rates of pay will almost certainly result in the emergence of wage and salary differentials between hospitals. Hospitals that are successful in competition for service contracts will be able to offer higher rates of pay to attract good quality staff. Similarly, hospitals located in areas with tight labour markets will have more freedom to offer competitive wages and salaries. In some cases, of course, higher rates of pay will lead to higher unit costs and place hospitals at a relative disadvantage when bidding for service contracts. In other cases improvements in productivity at more efficient hospitals can be expected to offset higher rates of pay.
The ability to determine their own rates of pay will offer more flexibility and may work to the advantage of self governing hospitals, but it could have deleterious effects on staff recruitment and retention at other NHS hospitals. Nursing staff, for example, might be expected to respond to opportunities to earn better salaries in self governing hospitals, especially if salaries in other hospitals continue to be restricted by national pay agreements. Some NHS hospitals are already suffering from the loss of key nursing staff to the private sector in specialties such as intensive care and theatre nursing. Competition from self governing hospitals may well exacerbate this type of problem.
Doctors can also expect to be affected by the emergence ofsalary differentials. Apart from variations in rates of pay between hospitals there may well be greater variation within hospitals. Some specialties will hold more revenue generating potential than others. In a system of workload funding there will be an incentive to link salaries more closely to the income generated by individual doctors and specialties. How far and fast this process will develop is difficult to predict.
Similar uncertainties surround changes in conditions
